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In the Maghreb, civil society associations are one of  the main actors of  diversity and pluralism. 
Although in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria there are very different political regimes, it can be 
seen that, since 2012, after the protest movements of  the Arab Spring, there has been a convergent 
trend towards restoring government control of  the association fabric. The governments of  these 
countries try, in effect, to impede the international activity of  these associations that promote 
democracy, human rights and civil liberties. To do so they use quite similar snares, such as the 
imposition of  bureaucratic obstacles or complaints about international interference in the fund-
ing of  these associations. This situation is a good indicator of  the difficulties encountered by the 
democratic and pluralist aspirations of  Maghrebian societies faced with government authorities. 
In the Maghreb, voluntary associations are one 
of  the main social actors that endeavour to rep-
resent the heterogeneity and pluralism of  civil 
society.1 Depending on the sectors involved, the 
causes they defend and the autonomy of  ac-
tion they enjoy, they are bearers, implicitly or 
explicitly, of  a narrative that often counteracts 
the hegemony of  the official accounts of  the 
governors. Since 2012, after the mobilisations 
of  the Arab Spring, and despite the existence 
of  three political regimes in each one of  the 
countries involved – a young democracy in the 
process of  institutionalisation in Tunisia, an 
authoritarian monarchy with auxiliary demo-
cratic mechanisms in Morocco and a geronto-
cratic, presidentialist, praetorian and corporat-
ist Republic in Algeria –, there is a convergent 
trend towards the restoration of  control over 
1. This article presents some results of the projects “Problemas públicos y activismo en el Magreb. La participación 
social y política de los jóvenes en sus dimensiones locales y transnacionales”, funded by the Ministry of Economy, Industry 
and Competitiveness (CSO2014-52998-C3-2-P) and “Crisis y representación política en el norte de África. Dispositivos 
institucionales y contestación” (CSO2017-84949-C3-2-P), funded by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, 
the State Research Agency (AEI) and the European Regional Development Fund.
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the association fabric. This trend is reflected in 
the new laws regulating it (the case of  Algeria, 
in 2012) or in the discourses that announce the 
reform of  the latter (in the case of  Morocco, 
in 2013, and Tunisia, in 2017). In this respect, 
the management of  the association movement 
and, in particular, of  the sectors that promote 
the mobilisation of  the population in favour 
of  democracy, human rights, civil liberties and 
open society, has become a valuable indicator 
for understanding both the democratic aspira-
tions of  societies and the authoritarian reflexes 
of  the Maghrebian political regimes.
Tunisia: From Association Boom to 
the Threat of the Return of Control 
In Tunisia, the rise of  the association phe-
nomenon since the 2011 Revolution is an 
unprecedented phenomenon in the history of  
the country (Al-Farshishi, 2016). The liber-
alisation of  the right to association has been 
one of  the priorities of  the Higher Authority 
to achieve the objectives of  the revolution, 
political reform and democratic transition that 
was established after the flight of  the autocrat 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The proclamation 
of  Decree 88-2011 of  24 September 2011 is 
fundamentally liberal (Pérez Beltrán and 
García Marín, 2015). Although it maintains 
the obligation to inform the authorities that the 
association has been constituted, this is a mere 
formality, a notification that can be made in 
different ways and that, once completed, pro-
vides legal guarantees for the association. Each 
association constituted must send a letter to the 
General Secretariat of  the Government, acting 
in substitution of  the Ministry of  the Interior 
with respect to the previous regime. This letter 
marks the start date of  the legal existence of  
the association, which is ratified upon receipt 
of  the certificate of  approval of  the standing 
rules within a period of  less than thirty days. In 
the case of  a silence procedure, it is considered 
that the standing rules have been accepted and 
that the founders can publish the legalisation 
of  their organisation in the press and then in 
the Official State Gazette. With this last pro-
cedure the legal existence of  the association 
becomes definitively effective. These facilities 
to regularise the constitution of  associations 
have contributed to the exponential growth of  
the number of  registered organisations, which 
has doubled in little more than five years, from 
9,000 in 2011 to more than 20,000 in 2017.
Interest in the association formula 
expressed by Tunisian citizens and, in 
particular, youths, is reflected in the 
diversity of  fields where they carry out 
their activities.
Interest in the association formula expressed 
by Tunisian citizens and, in particular, youths, 
is reflected in the diversity of  fields where 
they carry out their activities. In addition to 
activities related to human rights, women or 
unemployed graduates, the promotion and 
defence of  new causes that were non-existent 
under the Ben Ali regime or did not have legal 
coverage, such as the associations working on 
the monitoring and surveillance of  democratic 
institutions and public policies, the promotion 
of  Amazigh culture, the defence of  LGBT 
rights, immigrants, heritage, the environment, 
the fight against corruption or transitional 
justice, stand out. Moreover, the appearance of  
multiple organisations run by young people and 
the large proportion of  youths who participate 
in them is remarkable (Desrues and Velasco, 
2015). This association boom has benefited 
from the interest of  international cooperation, 
especially the development agencies of  the 
United Nations, the European Union and the 
United States, which have mobilised consistent 
funds to promote and consolidate the Tunisian 
association fabric by considering it as a key ac-
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tor in the success of  the democratic transition.2 
The mobilised funds have led the Tunisian 
government to adopt Decree 51-83-2013 of  
18 November 2013, which sets the criteria, 
procedures and conditions for granting public 
funding, as well as the practical modalities of  
state support for the civil society actions (Pérez 
Beltrán and García Marín, 2015). Similarly, 
associations must publicly declare the aid re-
ceived from foreign subsidies and inform the 
General Secretariat of  the Government. How-
ever, despite the aid received, the reports and 
diagnoses on the association fabric highlight 
its weaknesses, particularly the reproduction 
of  the imbalances that affect the infrastructure 
and economic development of  the country. 
Thus, they highlight the concentration in the 
capital of  highly professionalised organisations, 
connected with international networks of  as-
sociations, foundations and cooperation and 
funding organisations. In contrast, the associa-
tions in the towns within the country, in spite of  
also benefiting from aid from the public powers 
and international cooperation agencies in the 
2. For example, between June 2011 and June 2012 the European Union reserved around 6,500,000 euros to support 
civil society through the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation of Support to Human Rights Defenders (EMHRF).
A protest in Tunis (Contacto Agency). 
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country, do not have the same level of  access as 
the former to the centres of  power and funding 
opportunities. Therefore, they continue to be 
more atomised, less professionalised and more 
dependent on projects and technical assistance 
from their partners or funders.
Together with the so-called “progressive” 
association sector that we have briefly pre-
sented, other initiatives, including those close 
to the Islamist Ennahda party, which formed 
part of  the government from 2012 to 2014, or 
related to the networks of  the different Salafi 
currents, which act in the charity, education or 
religious sector stand out. Although in the En-
nahda environment a series of  organisations are 
emerging that cover a whole range of  activities 
in defence of  sectoral interests and social and 
economic development, the truth is that, when 
it was in government, this Islamist party acted 
benevolently with a series of  organisations and 
informal groups that, in the name of  the Revo-
lution, persecuted the old petty tyrants of  the 
Ben Ali regime and had become guardians of  
morality and promoters of  sharia in the neigh-
bourhoods they controlled. With this procedure 
in many areas they replaced the state, whose 
services had disappeared. These groups, which 
were often members of  the local committees of  
the League for the Protection of  the Tunisian 
Revolution, have been accused in different 
places and on different occasions of  aggressions 
against militants of  the Nidaa Tounes party, of  
political groups of  the left or the General Un-
ion of  Tunisian Workers (UGTT) and against 
members of  the forces of  law and order. Faced 
with the growing ideological polarisation 
between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, the au-
thoritarian restoration in Egypt and the threat 
of  Jihadist terrorism, the League dissolved in 
May 2014. In that year, with Nidaa Tounes in 
government, control of  funds from Persian 
Gulf  countries to fund organisations related 
to the sectors that promote the re-Islamisation 
of  society became a goal. The argument used 
to justify it is that part of  these funds are used 
to finance terrorism. It should be said, then, 
that this dualistic development of  the associa-
tion sector reproduces another line of  fracture 
already institutionalised by the Ben Ali regime 
between progressives and Islamists, and that 
weighs heavily on the democratic regeneration 
of  institutions.
The truth is that, when it was in 
government, this Islamist party acted 
benevolently with a series of  organisations 
and informal groups that, in the name 
of  the Revolution, persecuted the old 
petty tyrants of  the Ben Ali regime and 
had become guardians of  morality and 
promoters of  sharia in the neighbourhoods 
they controlled
Faced with such numerical growth and 
interest from international agencies, govern-
ments and private foundations that cooperate in 
the country, the Tunisian government became 
concerned about its lack of  knowledge of  the 
reality of  the association sector. Thus, a few 
weeks after his appointment in 2016, Mehdi 
Ben Garbia, minister in charge of  relations 
with constitutional bodies, civil society and hu-
man rights, raised the question of  the reform 
of  the government decree of  September 2011, 
using two arguments: the first, to respond to 
the requirement of  Article 65 of  the new Con-
stitution to establish a specific law for associa-
tions and their funding. The second, the fight 
against terrorism or the possible laundering 
of  money with the funds received by certain 
associations, which could be used to fund ter-
rorist enterprises.3 The report of  the Tunisian 
3. See “Tunisie : Plus de 10.000 associations créées au cours des 5 dernières années sans aucun suivi de l’Eta”, 
Webdo, 27 October 2016.
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Financial Affairs Commission of  2017 to the 
Financial Action Task Force, the international 
body for combating money laundering and 
funding of  terrorism, emphasised the concern 
about the funding of  non-profit organisations, 
particularly the charitable ones of  a religious 
nature. Logically, the Financial Action Task 
Force stressed in its report the need to reform 
the 2011 legislation, which leaves the door 
open for a return to the constitution, opera-
tion, funding and sanctioning of  associations. 
The associations’ obligation to declare to the 
authorities their financial situation and, in 
particular, their origin, is one of  the recom-
mended measures and includes the possibility 
of  dissolution for those who do not comply with 
this requirement. In fact, in the opinion of  
civil society actors, a sector of  the government 
wants to take advantage of  the constitutional 
requirement of  a law to govern associations 
and introduce greater control of  political power 
over the association fabric beyond the currents 
that preach the re-Islamisation of  society, with 
the risks of  regression that this could mean in 
terms of  rights and freedoms.
Morocco: The Shadow of the 
Tutelage of the State in the Name 
of Terrorist Threat 
In Morocco, the reform of  the 2011 constitu-
tional text dedicated several articles to associa-
tions, an expanding sector that duplicated the 
number of  organisations between 2007 and 
2011, from 47,000 to over 100,000 registered. 
The Constitution presents the sector as an ac-
tor of  participatory democracy and considers 
that it should contribute to the preparation, 
implementation and evaluation of  the policies 
promoted by the elected institutions and public 
authorities (Article 12). To fulfil this mission, 
the Chamber of  Representatives approved the 
creation of  a “Council for Youth and Asso-
ciation Action” in December 2017. In January 
2012, after the end of  the mobilisations of  the 
20th February Movement (M20F), the Moroc-
can version of  the Arab Spring, the new govern-
ment, led for the first time by an Islamist from 
the Party of  Justice and Development, created 
a Ministry of  Relations with Parliament and 
Civil Society. In May 2014, the king announced 
that 13 March would be National Day to Com-
memorate Civil Society. There is no doubt that 
associations are of  interest to the political pow-
ers, who see in them an actor complementary 
to the action of  the state in the development 
and provision of  services for the population. 
This is shown, for example, by the launch of  
the National Human Development Initiative 
(INDH) in 2005, which channels most of  the 
activities of  local development and service to 
the population. However, what concerns the 
Palace and its sovereign ministries (Ministry of  
the Interior, General Secretariat of  the Govern-
ment, Ministry of  Justice or Foreign Affairs) is 
the autonomy that can be acquired by certain 
organisations that promote a critical discourse. 
The position of  these associations is used by 
the ministers of  the Justice and Development 
Party, which have been in the government 
since 2012, according to their detractors, on the 
one hand, to reinforce the Islamist association 
sector or sector favourable to its ideas, which it 
subsidises with public funds and, on the other, 
to limit the development of  the “progressive” 
association sector.
The Sovereign Ministers and the 
Harassment of the Critical Organisation 
The sovereign ministers are annoyed by the 
critical attitudes of  the organisations close to 
the left-wing opposition that fight for human 
rights, against corruption or to promote civil 
liberties. These organisations were to some 
extent prominent in the heart of  the 20th Feb-
ruary Movement in 2011 and receive the sym-
bolic, financial, technical or human support of  
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international organisations. In the name of  the 
fight against terrorism, first, and nihilism, sec-
ond, the organisations that receive international 
funding to carry out activities are attacked, 
which, according to the ministry, adhere only 
to the agenda of  foreign countries. Moreover, 
these same activities would negatively affect the 
country’s image and the antiterrorist struggle, 
so that the government goes on the offensive 
against civil society.4
The case of  the Moroccan Association of  
Human Rights is emblematic. It has been 
an association of  public interest since 
2000 that, since 2014, has received threats 
of  dissolution or withdrawal of  its status 
of  public interest on different occasions 
from the Ministry of  the Interior and the 
General Secretary of  the Government
Apart from the organisations suspected 
of  being close to the Frente Polisario or the 
Islamist Justice and Spirituality party, in the 
spotlight for some years have been the Moroc-
can Association of  Human Rights (AMDH), 
the local sections of  Transparency Maroc and 
Amnesty International, the Moroccan Asso-
ciation for Investigative Journalism (AMJI), 
Attac Maroc, Freedom Now, Human Rights 
Watch or Lawyers Without Borders, among 
others.5 The case of  the Moroccan Association 
of  Human Rights is emblematic. It has been an 
association of  public interest since 2000 that, 
since 2014, has received threats of  dissolution 
or withdrawal of  its status of  public interest 
on different occasions from the Ministry of  
the Interior and the General Secretary of  the 
Government. With the reporting of  unfounded 
accusations of  the use of  torture by the state 
security services, the Minister of  the Interior 
referred to a recent report of  the AMDH that, 
in line with Amnesty International, reported 
the existence of  this practice.6 This issue is 
sensitive to the extent that cases of  torture are 
brought before the UN International Commit-
tee against Torture. The Moroccan authorities 
fear that these allegations will favour countries 
party to an extension of  the mandate of  the 
United Nations Mission for the Referendum 
in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the Sahara 
for the protection of  human rights. Since then, 
the public activities of  the AMDH have faced 
various obstacles from the authorities, espe-
cially by refusing to provide meeting rooms in 
public buildings, pressure on private operators 
not to give up meeting spaces and the refusal to 
accept the delivery of  the dossier of  submission 
of  the standing rules or the receipt that certifies 
such delivery, in the case of  the creation of  new 
sections or the renewal of  the bureaus.7 In line 
with the Ministry of  the Interior, the General 
Secretary of  the Government has repeatedly 
threatened the AMDH with dissolution and, to 
this end, as a measure of  retaliation against the 
association’s attitude, it cites the fact that it has 
not submitted an annual financial report.8 The 
human rights defence organisation responds 
that it does not have to inform the government 
in this regard, since it only uses foreign funds 
and, according to the legislation, although it 
4. See the report of the International Federation for Human Rights “Maroc : un ministre accuse les ONG de répondre à 
un agenda étranger et d’entraver la lutte contre le terrorisme”, 29/07/2014, https://www.fidh.org/La-Federation-internationale-
des-ligues-des-droits-de-l-homme/maghreb-moyenorient/maroc/15831.
5. Faced with such harassment, the Réseau des Associations Victimes d’Interdiction (RAVI) was created. See N. Miridja-
nian, “Au Maroc, des ONG de plus en plus muselées”, Libération, 28 January 2018, http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2018/01/28/
au-maroc-des-ong-de-plus-en-plus-muselees_1625156.
6. M. Jaabouk, “Maroc : L’AMDH a recensé 317 cas de détentions politiques en 2013”, Yabiladi, 18/06/2014.
7. See the website of the AMDH-France, http://amdhparis.org/wordpress/
8. See S. Sbiti, “Driss Dahak demande à l’AMDH de dévoiler ses comotes”, Tel Quel, 15 August 2014, http://telquel.
ma/2014/08/15/driss-dahak-demande-amdh-devoiler-comptes_1413387
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risks losing its status as an association of  public 
interest, there is no legal reason for its dissolu-
tion. Lastly, in 2017, the Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs joined the other departments in adopt-
ing this attitude and announced its intention to 
control the international funds that the associa-
tions receive. In the name of  the fight against 
terrorism it has asked all the diplomatic delega-
tions and international representatives present 
in the country to inform it about the projects 
eligible for funding.9 International financial aid 
is vital for most associations, as their own funds 
are very limited (CESE, 2016). Thus, after the 
rejection of  associations’ registration applica-
tion and the obstacles to the development of  
their activities, the third means used is the 
control of  access to foreign funding. Although 
the administrative judiciary systematically an-
nuls the decisions of  the local administrative 
authority when it rejects the submission of  the 
provision receipt and insists that the suspension 
or dissolution of  an association depends only on 
judicial power, and even though the Ministry 
of  the Interior has been condemned for the il-
legality of  the prohibition of  holding a public 
conference in the Rabat National Library in 
2014,10 the authorities maintain pressure on the 
critical association sector and elevate it to the 
position of  an authentic political opposition.
The Selective Attitude of the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) towards Civil 
Society
The first leader of  the Islamist government, 
Abdelilah Benkirane (President of  the Govern-
ment between 2012 and 2016), has not been 
very sensitive to the abuses of  civil liberties, 
beyond the cases that affected the organisations 
sympathetic to his ideological leaning. He has 
been targeted because of  the conflictive rela-
tion he has had with the feminist association 
sectors, while the Ministers of  Communication 
and Justice have limited themselves to advis-
ing the associations victim of  the decisions of  
the Secretariat General of  the Government 
or the Ministry of  the Interior that enforce 
their rights before the court and to recall that 
the authors of  false reports of  torture can be 
pursued by the law (Desrues, 2015).
The first leader of  the Islamist 
government, Abdelilah Benkirane 
(President of  the Government between 
2012 and 2016), has not been very sensitive 
to the abuses of  civil liberties, beyond 
the cases that affected the organisations 
sympathetic to his ideological leaning
 
The head of  the Ministry in Charge of  
Relations with the Parliament and Civil So-
ciety launched in 2013 the National Dialogue 
on Civil Society and the New Constitutional 
Prerogatives Roles and brought together in 
meetings, according to the data, around 9,000 
associations (Desrues, 2015). However, he has 
been criticised for the partisan use of  his posi-
tion to promote Islamist organisations and stig-
matising those associations that defend causes 
or ideologies he does not share with the excuse 
that they receive funds from foreign sources. 
Among the examples of  the latter we have the 
Moroccan Association for the Fight Against 
AIDS (ALCS), the Moroccan Association of  
Human Rights (AMDH), the Alternatives 
Forum in Morocco (FMAS) or Bayt Al Hikma. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the “progres-
9. T. Savage, “Les Affaires étrangères reprennent la main sur la coopération en contrôlant les financements étrangers 
au Maroc”, Tel Quel, 7 April 2017, <https://telquel.ma/2017/04/07/les-affaires-etrangeres-reprennent-main-cooperation-en-
controlant-les-financements-etrangers-ongmarocaines_1542159> 
10. See “L’État marocain s’achemine-t-il vers l’interdiction de l’Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH) 
d’exercer ses activités?”, 4 August 2014, http://amdhparis.org/wordpress/?p=1458
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sive” association sector refused to participate 
in the National Dialogue on Civil Society and 
supported the Appel de Rabat, an alternative 
initiative signed by 500 associations to establish 
a national dialogue outside the tutelage of  
the government. This sector fears an alliance 
between government conservatives, whether 
ministers of  the Justice and Development 
Party (PJD) or sovereignty ministers (Interior, 
the General Secretariat of  the Government), 
to promote restrictive legislation that further 
hampers the development of  a democratic 
and plural civil society that shares the values 
of  universally recognised human rights. Bill 
No. 89-15, concerning the Advisory Council 
for Youth and Community Action, adopted by 
the Chamber of  Representatives in December 
2017, ratifies the fears of  the Appel of  Rabat, 
since it proposes the establishment of  a power 
under the control of  the king and the govern-
ment, with a purely consultative function and 
unable to act on its own initiative.
In the context of  the wave of  protests of  
the Arab Spring, to prevent a contagion 
effect that threatened the country, 
subjected to a series of  riots in different 
places due to the increase in the prices of  
basic consumer products during January 
2011, the President adopted a series of  
measures to buy the social peace funded by 
the revenue from hydrocarbons
Within the Moroccan political context, the 
organisations that defend rights and promote 
democracy and public liberties have become 
the last critical stronghold with international 
scope after the domestication of  most of  the 
political parties (Desrues, 2018). In this respect, 
the attitude of  the ministers of  the PJD is illus-
trative of  the political class’s conformism with 
the guidelines of  the sovereign ministries. The 
international repercussion of  the activism that 
some associations carry out annoys the public 
powers, which present their action within re-
spect for human rights and the framework of  
the “democratic option” reiterated by the king 
in his speeches.
Algeria: Reforming the Law  
to Retake Control 
In 2011, Algeria had a little over 93,000 reg-
istered associations, according to the Ministry 
of  the Interior. Although most of  them are 
local in scope (Izarouken, 2012), a small group 
of  organisations in the field of  human rights, 
civil liberties and the cultural and linguistic 
rights of  the Amazighs concern the Algerian 
government. In the context of  the wave of  pro-
tests of  the Arab Spring, to prevent a contagion 
effect that threatened the country, subjected 
to a series of  riots in different places due to 
the increase in the prices of  basic consumer 
products during January 2011, the President 
of  the Republic Abdelaziz Buteflika adopted 
a series of  measures to buy the social peace 
funded by the revenue from hydrocarbons. In 
June of  the same year, he convened the “États 
généraux de la société civile”, whose recom-
mendations advocated the liberalisation of  the 
right to association. However, Law no. 12-06 
of  12 January 2012, which repealed the 1990 
law, introduced restrictive provisions both for 
the creation of  new associations and for those 
that previously existed, by subjecting them 
to an authorisation regime that replaces the 
declarative regime in force to date based on 
simple notification. This legislative modifica-
tion allows for greater control by the authori-
ties over the association fabric and leaves the 
multiple associations created in the framework 
of  Law no. 90-31 of  4 December 1990 in a 
vulnerable situation, which had worked for 
years with a simple declaration, but without 
receiving a confirmation clearly stipulated by 
the administration, as the silence procedure 
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acted as authorisation (Human Rights Watch, 
2014). The new legislation confirms what was 
announced by the leaders’ statements when, 
in the mid-2000s, they resumed the idea of  
reforming the association law (Benramdanne, 
2015). At that time, the Algerian government 
formulated two types of  criticism of  the as-
sociation world: the interference of  foreign 
powers through the introduction of  external 
activity and funding agendas, on the one hand, 
and the social or economic uselessness of  the 
associations, the vast majority of  which were, 
it said, inactive or had little impact on society 
despite the public subsidies received, on the 
other (Benramdanne, 2015). Paradoxically, in 
the name of  reactivation of  association life, so 
that it fulfils its role of  encouraging citizens 
and providing responses to social demands, 
this new legislation was adopted, which offers 
the advantage for the government of  facilitat-
ing the neutralisation of  critical associations 
and support for associations that serve the 
interests of  the Presidency of  the Republic. In 
other words, the aim is to create a civil society 
that extends the traditional clientelist system. 
With the new legislation, it is estimated that 
two thirds of  the existing associations had not 
renewed their authorisation in 2015, which 
might suggest two situations: that they have 
disappeared or that they are in an active situa-
tion of  an alegal nature and, therefore, under 
the threat of  being persecuted by the law. 
Another phenomenon that slows down the 
development of  associations is related to the 
attitude of  the police and the gendarmerie, 
which continue investigating the founding 
members of  the associations that request 
authorisation, even though the law does not 
provide for this. Neither do the authorities 
always deliver the receipt of  submission of  
register of  the standing rules or respond to 
authorisation requests with which, never-
theless, the legislation requires compliance. 
The organisations affected by the obstruc-
tion of  the forces of  law and order or public 
administration generally work in the field of  
the promotion of  democracy and defence of  
human rights and civil liberties. Association 
pluralism is also limited with the argument 
of  preventing the interference of  foreign in-
terests in the country. Any foreign cooperation 
or funding has to be reported to the Algerian 
administration, which, before deciding on its 
authorisation, will assess whether or not it 
contravenes national values (Article 22). Apart 
from the authorisation and access to public 
funding, since 2014 control by the Ministry 
of  the Interior has also been carried out when 
certain organisations ask to hold public meet-
ings (Driss-Aït Hamadouche, 2017). 
In the name of  reactivation of  association 
life, so that it fulfils its role of  encouraging 
citizens and providing responses to 
social demands, this new legislation was 
adopted, which offers the advantage 
for the government of  facilitating the 
neutralisation of  critical associations and 
support for associations that serve the 
interests of  the Presidency of  the Republic
The authorities are adept at cloning associa-
tions and are also using the internal conflicts that 
many associations go through to exploit splits 
or contribute to them. The tendency to resolve 
conflicts through splits helps to weaken asso-
ciations and the multiplication of  organisations 
with similar spheres and objectives, as was the 
case with the Algerian League for the Defence 
of Human Rights (Human Rights Watch, 2014). 
The ideological polarisation between Islamists 
and progressives is another means that successive 
governments have used to justify their interfer-
ence without having to resort to repression (Dris 
and Dris-Aït Hamadouche, 2012). 
In short, despite the exponential growth 
in the number of  associations, the fact is that 
Algerian civil society is weakened and unable to 
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fulfil the role of  mediator between society and 
state, which partly explains the multiplication 
of  social mobilisations of  protest throughout 
the territory, which usually end in riots that 
trigger populist or clientelist responses, or 
police repression.
 
Conclusions
The right to freedom of  association is rec-
ognised in the three Maghrebian countries. 
However, only Tunisia has legislation that 
comes close to the full exercise of  this right. 
However, voices are heard from the govern-
ment expressing the intention to reform 
legislation in the name of  transparency in the 
internal management of  associations, control 
of  funds from abroad and the fight against 
international interference or terrorism. These 
arguments are reminiscent of  those used in 
neighbouring countries, Algeria and Morocco, 
to bias freedom of  association and establish 
control of  the public powers over the organi-
sations critical of  their respective policies. In 
this regard, the converging trend between 
Algeria and Morocco to use the same tricks 
is striking: refusal to register the request 
for authorisation or to deliver the receipt of  
submission of  the said request, impeding the 
holding of  public activities, control of  coop-
eration with international organisations and 
access to international funding, and so on. 
These measures, taken in the name of  the 
fight against radicalism and terrorism, are 
always aimed at organisations that promote 
democracy, defence of  human rights and civil 
liberties. This situation is a good indicator of  
the difficulties encountered by the democratic 
and pluralist aspirations of  Maghrebian so-
cieties in the face of  the permanence of  the 
authoritarian syndrome among the ruling 
circles of  their respective countries.
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